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Abstract
We consider a situation where an exhaustible-resource seller faces demand from
a buyer who has a perfect substitute but there is a time-to-build delay for the
substitute. We nd that in this simple framework the basic implications of the
Hotelling model (1931) are reversed: over time the stock declines but supplies
increase up to the point where the buyer decides to switch. Under such a threat
of demand change, the supply does not re ect the true current resource scarcity
but leads to increased future scarcity, felt during the transition to the substitute
supplies. The analysis suggests a perspective on costs of oil dependence.
JEL Classication: D4; D9; O33; Q40.
Keywords: dynamic bilateral monopoly, Markov-perfect equilibrium, depletable
resources, energy, alternative fuels, oil dependence
1 Introduction
Policies such as fuel taxes, technology programs, or even international agreements on
pollution emissions reductions are likely to entail a demand change in some important
exhaustible-resource markets. When resource sellers are strategic, they have an incen-
tive to distort these policies to their own advantage, potentially leading to an increased
¤Gerlagh ?Reyer.Gerlagh@manchester.ac.ukA is at the Economics Department of the University of
Manchester. Liski ?liski@hse.A is at the Economics Department of the Helsinki School of Economics
and research associate at the MIT-CEEPR. This research was initiated at the Center for Advanced
Studies (CAS) in Oslo 2005-2006. We thank CAS for generous support and Michael Hoel in particular
for indispensable insights to the problem. We also thank Brita Bye, Markus Haavio, Markus Herrmann,
Juuso Välimäki, and seminar participants at U. of Birmingham, Catholic U. of Chile, NEMIEC-Island,
HECER-Helsinki, U. of Manchester, U. of Toulouse, U. of Stirling and U. of Birmingham for valuable
comments. Liski is grateful for funding from Academy of Finland and Nordic Energy Research.
1dependence on the resource. To understand the seller side e¤ort to distort the adoption
of demand-changing policies, we consider a simple framework where a monopolistic seller
(or a group sellers coordinating actions) of an exhaustible resource faces demand from
a buyer (or a group of buyers coordinating actions) who has a perfect substitute but
there is a time-to-build delay for the substitute. We nd that in this framework the basic
implications of the Hotelling model (1931) are reversed: over time the resource stock
declines but supplies increase, rather than decrease, up to the point where the buyer
decides to initiate the transition to the substitute. Under such a threat of change in the
demand infrastructure, the supply today does not re ect the true resource scarcity, but
it seeks to postpone the buyer*s decision and to increase the future scarcity felt during
the transition time to the substitute when the buyer is still dependent on the resource.
Our research builds on Hotelling*s theory of exhaustible-resource consumption (1931),
Nordhaus* (1973) concept of a backstop technology,1 and the extensive literature on
strategic equilibria in resource economics. Our main addition to the standard frame-
work for analysis is the inclusion of a time-to-build delay for the backstop. Previous
literature closest to our approach can be divided on the assumptions made for the strate-
gic variable on the buyer side.2 First, there is a large literature on optimal tari¤s in
depletable-resource markets showing how coordinated action on the buyer side can be
used to decrease the seller*s resource rent (e.g., Newbery, 1983, Maskin and Newbery,
1990; see Karp and Newbery 1993 for a review). Kamien and Hörner (2004) provide
a general view on these models by showing that the problem faced by a monopsonistic
exhaustible-resource buyer is formally equivalent to that faced by a Coasian durable-
good monopoly. We depart from the Coasian framework because the buyer is not a pure
monopsony and has a di¤erent strategic variable (the substitute). While import tari¤s
1Nordhaus (1973) was the rst to dene and analyze the concept of backstop technology in
exhaustible-resource markets. He dened it as follows: "The concept that is relevant to this prob-
lem is the backstop technology, a set of processes that (1) is capable of meeting the demand requirements
and (2) has a virtually innite resource base" (Nordhaus, 1973, pp. 547-548).
2There is a large but less closely related literature focusing purely on seller power in the exhaustible-
resource framework. Hotelling himself (1931) already analyzed the monopoly case. Salant (1976) con-
sidered an oligopolistic market structure with one dominant rm, and Lewis and Schmalensee (1980)
analyzed an oligopoly with all rms some market power. This literature has developed on two frontiers.
First, it has focused on developing less restrictive production strategies: from path strategies as in Lewis
and Schmalensee, Loury (1986) and Polansky (1992), to decision rule strategies as, for example, in Salo
and Tahvonen (2001). Second, the literature has developed more natural cost concepts for extraction
under which the resource is economically rather than physically depleted. See Salo and Tahvonen (2001)
for a discussion and contribution on this.
2and fuel taxes are important, they are more  exible instruments as compared to the
development or adoption of substitute technologies that have a permanent e¤ect on the
resource dependence. The latter thus creates potentially greater or at least very di¤erent
strategic threats to the seller. To be e¤ective, optimal tari¤s have to be successful in
changing the dynamic demand perceived by the seller. The degree of success obviously
depends on the precise formulation of the game, but generally the seller*s sales path still
follows a Hotelling rule modied to take into account the buyers* tari¤ policy. This leads
to supplies declining over time. We believe that the technology threat potentially is a
more important determinant of how sellers perceive their future demand.
Second, there is a large but somewhat dated literature on the same bilateral monopoly
situation where the buyers* strategic variable is to develop or adopt a substitute technol-
ogy. Early papers such as Dasgupta et al. (1983), Gallini et al. (1983), and Hoel (1983)
assume the buyer exploits a Stackelberg leadership and can commit to a deterministic
R&D program for the development of the substitute. The results provide interesting
insights into how the buyer side can extract the seller*s rent by altering the timing of
sales. Later developments analyzed the role of leadership and commitment (Lewis et al.,
1986) and, nally, probabilistic success in R&D and Markov-perfect strategies (Harris
and Vickers, 1995). None of the above papers predict that the basic Hotelling implica-
tions are reversed, although Harris and Vickers (1995) obtain a result that sales path
may be non-monotonic (but not generically increasing).3
The market structure we describe is such that not only sellers have market power
but also buyers enjoy some power so that no party is in explicit leadership. The nature
of the strategic interaction between buyers and sellers is preserved in the limiting case
without discounting, which allows an essentially static analysis and it shows the way to
analyze the discounted case. Moreover, in addition to market structure assumptions and
asymmetric information, we depart from previous literature in that we abstract from
the precise instrument implementing the structural change in demand: when action is
taken, it changes the demand irreversibly after a time lag. This abstraction simplies the
strategic variable on the buyer side while keeping what seems essential in the relationship.
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 2, we discuss some developments
3It should be clear that we are focusing on how strategic relationships in the resource market shape
the supplies. There are also other ways to explain the failure of the standard Hotelling model (see
Dasgupta and Heal (1974) for the standard model), or its extensions, to match reality (see Krautkramer
(1999) for a review of the literature). And there are other ways to extend the traditional economic
growth-resource depletion model such that supplies increase over time (cf. Tahvonen and Salo 2001).
3in the oil market that motivate our study. In Section 3, we introduce the basic resource
allocation problem by considering the social optimum, consumers* optimum, and also by
having a rst look at the equilibrium. In Section 4, we introduce and analyze the game
under perfect information. In Section 5, we investigate the changes to equilibrium and
robustness of overall ndings under discounting. In Section 6, we conclude by discussing
alternative approaches to the problem and potential implications for the oil market.
2 Motivating example: the market for cheap oil
Our contribution is to the basic exhaustible-resource theory but we are motivated by
some recent developments a¤ecting the oil market. First, while there is no single buyer
in the oil market, policies aiming to reduce dependence on imported oil imply a collective
action on the consumer side. Whatever the reason for policies  need to safeguard the
economy against macroeconomic risks or perhaps global warming  they are likely to
a¤ect how oil producers perceive their future demand, in uencing supplies today.4 The
results suggest that, under such a threat of structural change in oil demand, the true
resource scarcity cannot be read from current supply.
Second, while it is clear that the world will never run out of all fossil fuel sources,
it is equally clear that we may run out of conventional, cheap oil. The ownership of
the cheapest oil reserve is extremely concentrated by any measure and concentration
is expected to increase in the near future.5 The concentration of ownership implies
that strategic management of the cheap oil stocks is likely even without a formal cartel
among producers. Cheap oil producers understand their in uence on market development
and take an active role in "demand management"; they often communicate like central
bankers with the market, emphasizing credibility and security of supply.6 The resource
that, for example, Saudi Arabia is controlling is unique in that it allows extraction of high
4The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (2006), while being a very comprehensive
cost-benet analysis, is also a political document illustrating the willingness to take actions changing
the demand for fossil-fuels.
5See the "2007 Medium-Term Oil Market Report" published by the International Energy Agency for
estimates of the Core OPEC reserves. The Saudi share of the Core OPEC stocks is expected to increase
over time.
6The following citation describes this: We*ve got almost 30 percent of the world*s oil. For us, the
objective is to assure that oil remains an economically competitive source of energy. Oil prices that are
too high reduce demand growth for oil and encourage the development of alternative energy sources
(Adel al-Jubeir, foreign policy adviser of crown prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, Herald Tribune, Jan
24, 2007).
4quality output with relatively little capital investment. It also allows for rapid and large
production rate changes. Reserves with such properties are at the heart of the economics
of the oil dependence because, roughly put, the remainder of the fossil fuel supply is
capital intensive and costly when used for the production of liquid fuels. In fact, what
is essential for the strategic interaction that we consider is the existence of a low-cost
but nite reserve with concentrated ownership and inelastic short-run demand; the rest
of coil* production can be seen as part of substitute fuel production, including costly
conventional oil sources, nonconventional oils, biofuels, and alternative energy sources.7
While the relationship between major oil importers and exporters is clearly not an
open bargaining situation, as explicit contracts are not conceivable in the context, it
h a sa  avor of bargaining taking place through markets where o¤ers and responses are
implicit. Sellers* focus on secure supply suggests a compensation to the importing party
for continuing potentially costly dependence. On the buyer side, trust in the relationship
is expressed by voluntary inaction, that is, postponement of actions changing the demand
structure. Our timing assumptions for strategies are perhaps better suited for capturing
what is material in this kind of relationship than those used in earlier literature.
3 The resource allocation problem
3.1 Socially optimal resource dependence
Before going to strategic interactions, we start the analysis by looking at socially optimal
resource use. This way we will introduce the basic elements of the model and pro-
vide a benchmark so that distortions introduced by strategic interactions become clear.
Throughout this section we assume that time is continuous.
Consider an economy starting at time w =0w i t ha nite resource endowment v0
that can be consumed at rate tw yielding a strictly concave utility e x(tw). We assume no
extraction costs. The resource has a substitute that provides the same service and ends
the need to use the resource. The economy can choose to adopt the substitute by paying
one-time cost LA0at any w, wait for interval of time n, so that the alternative replaces the
resource at w+n, and then pay ongoing cost fA0per time unit for using the substitute.
The substitute thus replaces the resource fully: cost f i sa  ow cost of maintaining the
7There are di¤erent denitions of conventional and nonconventional oils, and these also change over
time; see the Hirsch Report (prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, 2005). The report makes clear
that the important scarcity is in the reserves of high-quality conventional oil.
5alternative supply infrastructure independent of the supply level. We ask the following
simple question: how much of the resource should be used before actions are taken, and
how much should be left for the transition time interval towards the substitute?
The maintenance costs will prevent an early development of the substitute by the
buyer before the substitute is used.8 We abstract from the substitute*s marginal produc-
tion costs and resource extraction costs, but could as well have assumed that marginal
production costs for the substitute fall short of resource extraction costs so that the re-
source has no use when the subsitute is in place. The assumptions on costs ease the
exposition but are not central to our results. Even if the resource can compete with the
substitute, the three main features that support our analysis can be maintained.9 First,
if supplied in large quantities, the buyer prefers the resource to the substitute. This fea-
ture gives the seller some bargaining power as it ensures that the buyer has an interest in
exhausting the resource. Second, prots for the resource owner decrease when the substi-
tute is available compared to the situation without the substitute. This feature ensures
that the seller will try to delay the investment in the substitute and it transfers some
bargaining power to the buyer. Third, early investment in the substitute is costly. This
feature ensures that the substitute does not become available before it is used capping
the buyer*s strategic power. Introducing extraction cost for the resource, introducing
reversibility of the change in demand, or including uncertainty regarding success of the
process do a¤ect the precise answers. However, that the substitute is costly and that
it takes time to build up the new demand infrastructure are the two assumptions that
capture most of the action in the strategic interaction.
To describe the social optimum, it is useful to treat the interval of time over which
there is some resource consumption as an excursion from the long-run situation where
the substitute is present and consumers enjoy surplus ¹ x per time unit. The consumer
price is sw = #(tw)=e x 0 ( t w ) , and demand is subsequently dened by tw = G(sw)=#
¡ 1 ( s w ) ,
so we can write the long-run surplus  ow as
¹ x = e x(G(0)) ¡ f=
For future reference, we separate the consumers and producers overall surplus from re-
source consumption. Sellers* prot  ow is (tw)=# ( t w ) t wand assumed to be strictly
8With discounting, maintenance costs are not required as saved interest on investment costs are
su¢cient to ensure that the investment does not take place too early.
9In the footnote after lemma 1, we show that the equilibrium does not change qualitatively if the
substitute and the resource can compete.
6concave. Consumers* surplus is x(tw)=e x ( t w )¡ ( t w ) , and need not be concave.10 We
assume that surplus x(tw) is everywhere nonlinear,11 di¤erentiable, and bounded at some
level above ¹ x. The resource can thus provide surplus above long-run level ¹ x. Through-
out the paper we assume that stock v0 is large enough, so that actions to end resource
consumption are not taken immediately but at some WA0 .
We assume no discounting for now.12 We denote the seller*s stock-dependent payo¤
by Y (vw) and consumers* payo¤ by Z(vw) if there has been no investment before w. Ex-
pression Y (vw) measures cumulative (undiscounted) future prots while Z(vw) measures
cumulative surplus from the excursion above the long-run surplus from time w onwards:
Y (vw)=
Z W + n
w
 ( t ) g (1)
Z(vw)=
Z W + n
w
[ x ( t )¡x ] g (2)
The social optimum depends on the time interval of resource use, W + n, and the
supply path tw, that maximizes total resource surplus
W(vw)=Y( v w )+Z( v w)=
Z W + n
w
[ e x ( t )¡x ] g (3)
Notice that we leave the investment costs out of the welfare function since, without
discounting, the timing of investment has no bearing on the net present value of its costs.13
The socially optimal supply solves a simple problem: Maximize (3) with respect to t and
W and subject to _ v = ¡t= Let variable  measure the marginal value of the resource.
The optimality conditions are: (i) marginal utility should equal the marginal value of the
resource, e x0(t)= , (ii) marginal value of the resource at the end point W is equal to the
extra utility it provides per extra unit of the resource, W+n =( e x ( t W + n ) ¡ x ) @tW+n, and (iii)
without discouting, the marginal value of the resource should be constant,  = . From
10Consumer surplus will be a central determinant of the buyer*s investment decision, but our results
do not require a particular form for x(t). For example, under linear demand, x(t) is convex on [0>G(0)]
and constant thereafter. For constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions, x(t) is concave
for all values of the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion.
11That is, there is no non-empty interval (d>e), with d?e , such that x(t) is linear over (d>e).
12In Section 5, we extend the model to positive discounting. It is not obvious that the undiscounted
case is the true discounted equilibrium limit (see Dutta 1991), but in our case it is, as we will verify.
13As we will see, in the case without discounting, the level of investment required does not a¤ect
supply levels in the equilibrium. In the discounting case, it does, see (22), as costs of investments enter
negatively in the costs of waiting ¹ x ¡ uL. For investments costs too large, LA¹ x
u , no investment takes
place.
7these three conditions, we can see that the resource surplus is linear, W(vw)=vw, and
the maximization is equivalent to maximizing the average excursion above the long-run
payo¤ x:
 = max
t [e x(t) ¡ x]@t=
It is instructive to see Figure 1, where we can nd the social optimal supply level t = t¤¤
on the curve of utility e x(t) such that the line through (0>x) and (t>e x(t)) has the steepest






Since consumer surplus is x(t)=e x ( t )¡t e x 0 ( t ) , we must have
x(t
¤¤)=x= (4)
Proposition 1 In the social optimum, consumers receive reservation utility level x in
all stages, while producers receive all the resource surplus. Consumers do not benet from
an increase in the resource stock, Z 0(v0)=0 .
Proof. The rst part of the proposition states that along the social optimal path,
the buyer side is indi¤erent between resource dependence and the substitute technology.
This part follows immediately from (4). The last part of the proposition then follows
from the denition of the buyer*s payo¤ (2).
¤¤¤ Insert Fig. 1 here ¤ ¤¤
3.2 Buyers* rst-best
Consider then what would be the rst-best for the buyer side. This corresponds to a
situation where producers are perfectly competitive and the time of investment is chosen
to maximize Z(vw) only. Competitive sellers rationally foresee when the buyer side is
going to invest and based on this, they choose a constant supply path to equalize prices
across times before and after the investment. We can copy the template from the social
optimum to show that along consumers* rst-best path, welfare Z(=) is linear, that is,
Z(v)=v for some constant . In gure 1, we can maximize the buyer*s value of the
14We use one asterisk for equilibrium constants, and two asterisks for social optimum constants. Some
equilibrium constants are rst presented as part of the buyers* optimum, and these are therefore also
denoted by one asterisk.
8resource if we nd the supply level t¤ on the curve of utility surplus x(t) where the
line through (0>x) and (t>x(t)) has the steepest slope. The solution either takes the






¤ ) = (5)
We have a simple graphical determination of the consumers* optimum,16 which is unique
as x(=) is nonlinear everywhere. In turn t¤ determines the date of investment, by W +n =
v0@t¤. Relative to the social optimum, consumers can increase their payo¤ by forcing
sellers to sell the resource faster:
Proposition 2 The resource supply in the buyers* optimum exceeds resource supply in
social optimum: t¤ At ¤¤. The time interval of resource dependence is shortened.
Proof. From (5) and x0 A 0, it follows that x(t¤) A x, and thus t¤ At ¤¤.
The opposing interests are now clear: the seller side would like to delay investment as
much as possible (to spread supplies thinly over time as prots are concave), the social
optimum requires that consumers at least receive reservation utility, and the buyer side
prefers even faster depletion.17 It is obvious that in the equilibrium of the game supplies
and investment time must lie between the extremes identied here.
For the equilibrium, an important feature is whether the maximal supply that the
seller is willing to provide (maximizing instantaneous prots) increases consumer surplus
compared to the buyer*s rst best, or not. Recall that a larger t¤ follows from a greater
long-run surplus ¹ x: the buyer wants to consume the resource faster the better is the
outside option, that is, the lower is the cost of the alternative, f. If the substitute
provides a high consumer surplus so that the buyer prefers faster depletion compared to
the maximal supply the seller is willing to deliver, we call the substitute strong.
Den i t i o n1The buyer has a weak substitute if t¤ ?t p= argmaxf(t)g. Otherwise,
the substitute is strong.
15This is, for example, the case with a convex surplus function x(=).
16The graphical presentation of t¤ is very similar to the presentation of t¤¤ in Figure 1. The only
di¤erence is that x(=) should substitute for ~ x(=), and that x(=) need not be concave.
17These results are consistent with the common view that the seller*s market power makes the resource-
depletion path more conservative (see Hotelling 1931). Buyers* market power speeds up consumption
both in the optimal tari¤ literature (see Karp-Newbery 1993) and strategic R&D and technology liter-
ature (see the papers cited in the introduction).
9Thoughout this paper, we assume that the substitute is weak, unless explicitly other-
wise stated.18 Thus, we assume that the cost of the substitute is high enough such that
t¤ ?t p . The assumption ensures that the buyer*s rst-best is given by (5).19 For future
reference, we dene the buyer*s rst-best marginal value of the resource as

¤ =[ x ( t
¤ )¡x ] @t
¤=
In the buyers* optimum, the consumer share of total resource surplus Y (v)+Z( v 0 )is

¤v; the seller receives the remainder.
3.3 First look at equilibrium: investment indi¤erence
As we will show formally in Section 4, the key to the equilibrium is the seller*s strategy
to keep the buyer side indi¤erent between the following two actions: (i) invest today and
consume the remaining stock during the transition time interval n, and (ii) postpone the
decision by one marginal unit of time, maintaining the possibility for investing tomor-
row. The seller side postpones investment as long as possible by sustaining the buyer*s
indi¤erence. When the time interval is continuous, the indi¤erence can be characterized,
at each time w, by
x(tw)=¹ x+t w x
0 ( v w @n)= (6)
Under the postulated indi¤erence, surplus x(tw) should cover the cost from postponing
the long-run surplus  ow ¹ x by marginal unit of time, and the cost from depleting the
stock at rate tw.20 In view of Fig. 2, which depicts a concave surplus frontier and a
line summing up the two cost terms for a given vw, we see that the supply making the
indi¤erence to hold is uniquely dened by the intersection of the surplus curve (left-hand
side of (6) as a function of tw) and the cost curve (right-hand side for given vw). As the
resource is depleted, vw@n declines, which for concave x(=) causes the depletion cost to
increase. That is, the slope of the cost curve (RHS) increases and, therefore, quantity tw
18For the analysis of the strong substitute cases that we do not consider in this paper, we refer to
Gerlagh and Liski (2007).
19Since G(0) At p , the assumption tp At ¤implies that t¤ must be given by (5) and not by the
corner G(0).
20We immediately see that this condition closely resembles the buyer*s optimum (5). There is one
important distinction. Whereas the right-hand-side of the buyer*s optimum indi¤erence condition (5)
takes the constant marginal value of the resource at the buyer*s optimal path and so denes a constant
t¤, the strategic buyer*s indi¤erence condition (10) is based on the marginal value of the current resource
and so it denes a supply scheme tw that is dependent on the current resource level vw.






? 0 for tw ?v w @n,
as the numerator is negative while the denominator is positive. Thus, to postpone the
investment, supplies must increase when the remaining resource stock declines, until the
point where the buyers* optimum given by (5) and the indi¤erence (6) coincide. That
is, buyers will always invest when by doing so they can implement their rst best. The





It follows that at the time of investment, supplies under continuation and after investment
coincide, at level t¤. The overall path of supplies is thus increasing up to the point of
investment, after which it is constant. Later on, we will be more precise about the supply
path.
¤¤¤ Insert Fig. 2 here ¤ ¤¤
4 Strategic resource dependence
There are three types of agents in the model. First, producers of the resource form a
coherent cartel (from now on, the seller). Second, large number of competitive consumers
derive utility from resource consumption or, if present, from consuming the substitute
service provided by the substitute. Third, there is the consumers* agent who cares only
about the consumer surplus. The buyers* agent can a¤ect the surplus only by making
the decision to end the relationship with the seller. The decision is about changing the
demand infrastructure; we abstract from the precise policy instrument implementing the
change.22 Since the only strategic actions are taken by the seller and the buyer*s agent,
f r o mn o wo nw eu s et h ew o r d sc buyers* agent* and cbuyer* interchangeably. There is one
single market: the spot market for the resource  ow.
21The main model section will describe the general case of a not necessarily concave surplus.
22Note that the buyer*s agent does not need to carry the burden of the investment. It su¢ces to
assume that there is some coordinated policy (the buyer*s agent) that initiates the (market) transition
towards the substitute.
114.1 Timing and strategies
The economy has three stages, starting in initial stage before investment, w?W, labeled
with superscript c0*. The next stage follows investment, W · w?W+n , also called
the post-investment stage, and labeled with superscript c1*. The nal stage starts at
the arrival of the new substitute technology, w ¸ W + n. During the pre-investment
stage, buyer and seller interact strategically such that the seller chooses a supply level
t0
w, and the buyer decides whether or not to invest, gw 2f 0 > 1 g . Since the investment
decision is irreversible, the game moves to the investment stage permanently once the
buyer invests. During the post-investment stage, there are no strategic interactions. The
seller can only sell the remaining stock in interval of time n (or the monopoly quantity
tp = argmaxf(t)g if the stock is too large to be sold in this time span), and the buyer
side can only accept what is o¤ered to the market. We denote the quantity sold at time
w i nt h es e c o n ds t a g eb yt 1
w. In the nal stage, all resources remaining at time W + n are
left unused.
All strategic interaction thus takes place before investment and technically the equi-
librium is a stopping game. At any time w> if the game is in the pre-investment stage,
we denote the seller*s supply by t0
w and assume that there are three sub-stages with the
following timing:
1. Seller chooses a supply t0
w;
2. Buyer chooses gw 2f 0 >1 g ;
3. If gw =0 , market clears at t0
w. If gw =1 , the economy moves to post-investment
stage.
Here, the seller*s initial resource stock v0 is known by the buyer side with certainty,
and we can condition strategies on the remaining stock vw. We thus look for Markov-
perfect strategies of the form t0
w = (vw)> and gw = (vw>t0
w) 2f 0 > 1 g . 23 In section ??,
where we introduce asymmetric information about the stock size, we look for perfect
Bayesian strategies that depend on past sales rather than directly on stocks. In most
other aspects, the model set up will be the same in both sections.
Time is continuous but it proves useful to introduce the strategies for discrete time
periods, and let the time period over which strategies are dened converge to zero.
23Note that because of the timing assumption (the three substages above), the buyer*s Markov strategy
depends not only on the state but also on the seller*s o¤er. In this respect, a similar formulation is used
in Felli and Harri (1996) and Bergemann and Välimäki (1996).
124.2 The buyer*s problem
When buyers have taken the action to move to the substitute, the game is over: buyers
have no more decisions to make and the seller can only sell the remaining stock during
the transition time. When not yet used, the buyer*s strategic investment option will
a¤ect the supply levels. To describe the buyer*s payo¤, we need to make it contingent on
whether the strategic variable has been used or not. We dene ZL(vw) as the value of the
excursion above the long-run payo¤ measured again from current from time w onwards,
immediately after investment when resource dependence still continues for n units of
time. Z L(vw) is unambiguously determined by the seller*s post-investment supply policy
which is just t1
w = minftp>v w@ng for the remaining sales window.24 If the buyer*s decision




n ( x ( v w @n) ¡ ¹ x) if vW ? ntp
n(x(tp)¡ ¹ x) otherwise,
(7)
It follows that for vW ? ntp we have Z L0(vW)=x 0 ( v W@n), which measures the scarcity
cost to the buyer from continued resource dependence.
We assume that the seller has a strategy t0
w = (vw), and based on the seller*s strategy
we nd the strategy for the buyer to invest. The buyer*s best response to (vw) is best
understood when we consider supply constant over a small interval [w>w+%], and let
% converge to zero. Using the above expression for Z L(vw) and assuming the seller*s
strategy t0
w = (vw), we can write the expression for the payo¤ before the investment,
Z(vw), when the buyer optimizes over a short interval with length %:
Z(vw) = max
gw2f0>1g
f[%x((vw)) ¡ %¹ x + Z(vw ¡ %(vw))](1 ¡ gw)+Z
L( v w) g wg = (8)
Term %¹ x is the direct cost from postponing the investment since the buyer side loses
long-run surplus ¹ x for % units of time by not investing today. As % approaches zero, (8)





w ¡ %¹ x ¡ %t
0
wZ
0(vw)+Z( v w)](1 ¡ g)+Z
L( v w) g g > (9)
where we use shorthands x0
w = x((vw)) and t0
w = (vw). Thus, if choosing g =0is optimal,






0 ( v w ) = (10)
24Recall that prot (t) is concave so it is optimal to allocate the remaining stock evenly, or leave
some stock left if this would imply exceeding the monopoly quantity tp. In the presence of discounting,
the sales path is not  at, but declining as in Hotelling (1931). However, it still holds that all strategic
interactions end at the investment date. See the section on discounting.
13This is the key indi¤erence throughout this paper. It says that the consumer surplus un-
der continuation of the resource dependence, x0
w, covers the direct cost from continuing,
¹ x, and the marginal reduction in payo¤ from the fact that the stock available for con-
sumption during the remaining overall time interval of resource dependence is depleted,
t0
wZ 0(vw).
4.3 The seller*s problem
Let Y L(vW) denote the seller*s payo¤ if buyers make their decision to end the relationship




n(vw@n) if vW ? ntp
n(tp) otherwise.
(11)
To consider the seller*s problem before the decision is made, let Y (vw) denote the value
of the remaining stock to the seller conditional on no investment before w. For short time
interval %, and given the buyer*s strategy gw = (vw>t0
w), supply in the next % units of
time is t0
w if (vw>t 0
w)=0 . The economy immediately moves to the investment stage if
(vw>t 0
w)=1 . The seller*s best response satises










L( v w)  ( v w>t
0
w)g= (12)
When % approaches zero, this value can be approximated by (letting (¢)= ( v w >t0
w)):








0(vw)+Y( v w)](1 ¡ (¢) )+Y
L( v w)  ( ¢ ) g (13)
Given (vw>t 0
w), the seller can choose if there will be investment or not. If choice  =0







If choice  =1is implemented, then
Y (vw)=Y
L( v w ) = (15)
From theseconditions we can immediately see that theseller always prefers to continue
the relationship irrespective of the stock level. Recall that v¤ denotes the stock level at
which the buyer*s rst-best is to invest.
Lemma 1 If t0
w · vw@n for all vw > v¤, then the seller prefers continuation to stopping.
In particular, Y (v¤)=YL( v ¤ ) ,Y0 ( v w )AYL 0 ( v w )for all vw > v¤, and thus Y (vw) AYL( v w ) .
14Proof. Equality at v¤ follows from the buyer*s choice to invest at v¤: Y (v¤)=YL( v ¤ ) .
Assuming t0


















L 0( v w) =
The rst equality follows from (14), the second (weak) inequality is by assumption (t0
w ·
vw@n), the third (strict) inequality follows from a negative price slope, and the last (weak)
inequality follows from (11). By integration, Y (vw) AYL( v w )follows.
Thus, the csmooth pasting* condition does not hold for the seller for an intuitively
obvious reason: the buyer*s decision to invest implies a binding time-to-sell constraint for
the seller.25 The seller will never end the dependence before the buyer wants to end it, as
it is always protable to extend the sales time interval beyond W +n when discounting is
absent.26 For this reason, when the stock level is public knowledge and t0
w · vw@n , it will
be the buyer*s indi¤erence that determines the time to end the resource dependency. As
we will see below, with publicly observed stock levels vw, the seller will have no reason to
supply more before than after the investment, so condition t0
w · vw@n will always hold.27
4.4 Equilibrium
Establishing and characterizing equilibrium supply is a simple undertaking based on the
analysis of buyer*s indi¤erence between continuation and stopping, given that the seller
side never prefers stopping. We r s tp r o v et h a t( 7 )d e  nes the buyer*s welfare any time
before investment:
Lemma 2 In equilibrium, the buyer is indi¤erent between continuing the resource de-
pendence and investing at any given w prior to the investment date:
Z(vw)=Z
L( v w )for all vw ¸ v
¤ (16)
25The lemma shows that the model can easily be extended to cover the case when the seller has
the opportunity to sell its stock after the arrival of the substitute. The important feature is that the
marginal value of the resource after the arrival of the substitute must be less than #(t¤). Assume that
the substitute has marginal production costs pf. The marginal value of the resource after the arrival of
the substitute is thus pf. As long as marginal substitute costs are su¢ciently small, p f?# ( t ¤ ) , the
lemma will hold. Constant extraction costs do not change the trade-o¤ between supply before and after
the arrival of the substitute.
26We will derive this same condition also with discounting but there we need restrictions on the utility
formulation.
27However, when stock levels are unobserved, we will see that the condition can break down: the seller
may supply more before investment as compared to supply after investment. Such a strategy can be
used to make the buyer to believe that the stock is larger than it actually is.
15Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume Z(vw) AZ L ( v w )at some vw Av ¤ =
The inequality implies that the buyer will always choose gw =0in (8), irrespective of the
seller*s supply. In turn, the seller is not constrained to reduce supplies and he can extend
the time interval of resource dependence to obtain higher prices from all dates. Supply
will fall arbitrarily close to zero, the utility excursion compared to ¹ x becomes negative for
a time interval of unbounded length, and Z(vw) becomes negative (2), which contradicts
Z(vw) AZ L( v w ) .
It is thus the buyer*s indi¤erence that determines equilibrium supply policy, t0
w =
(vw). The buyer*s indi¤erence condition (16) together with (10) requires
x(t
0
w)=¹ x + t
0
w x




w )=¹ x otherwise. (18)
This is a slightly adjusted version of (6) because Z 0
w(vw)=x 0 ( v w @n) when vw ? ntp>
but Z 0
w(vw)=0otherwise as the stock level does not a¤ect supply if vw A ntp. We
have already illustrated this indi¤erence for a concave surplus x in Fig. 2. Recall that
the investment point satises t0
w = v¤@n = t¤, which is the buyer*s rst-best supply as it
maximizes the buyer*s payo¤ from this stock level onwards. The seller cannot compensate
the buyer for continuation after the stock has fallen just below v¤ because the buyer can
implement his rst-best by ending the relationship there. Alternatively put, the scarcity
cost exceeds the maximal marginal value of the resource,
Z
0(vw) A
¤=[ x ( t
¤ )¡x ] @t
¤>
when vw ?v ¤and x is (locally) concave.
We describe now the general case with x not necessarily concave. Recall that the






and that buyers never accept stock levels below nt¤, as buyers can always implement their
rst-best from time w onwards if they end the relationship at vw = nt¤. In the following it
is convenient to redene v¤ not to be the investment point in the buyer*s rst best, but
to be the equilibrium investment point. It is clear that we must have v¤ ¸ nt¤ for two
reasons. First, the buyer will always invest at vw = nt¤ to reach his rst best. Second, the
buyer*s indi¤erence (17) cannot be satised for a resource level vw just below v¤.28 This
28This follows from x(=) being nonlinear everywhere. It needs no concavity of x(=).
16way t¤ suggests the lowest stock level nt¤ where investment takes place. However, since
the consumer surplus is not generally concave, the buyer may also end the relationship at
some higher stock level vw A nt¤, because the scarcity cost x0(v@n) may locally increase
above 
¤ = x0(t¤) as vw@n declines from v0@n towards t¤. To deal with this, we dene v¤
to be the rst stock level below v0 such that x0(v¤@n)=
¤ . Stock v¤ is unique for given





for all v¤ ?v w·ntp. By continuity of x(=), t0
w = (vw) satisfying (17) to keep the buyer
indi¤erent between stopping and continuing exists and varies with the remaining stock
for v¤ ?v w? ntp.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique Markov-perfect equilibrium with v¤ as dened above,
t0
w dened by (17)-(18), and t1
w = v¤@n.
Proof. It su¢ces to prove that v¤ is determined properly. Clearly, we cannot take
v¤ to be smaller as such would imply an infeasible resource supply from (17). We will
now prove that v¤ cannot be larger either. For this, it is su¢cient to prove that v¤
maximizes the value of the resource to the seller. But this follows from Lemma 1: the
seller maximizes prots by continuing as long as possible.
Under nonconcave surplus, the increase in supply over time may not be monotonic as
the buyer*s scarcity cost x0(vw@n) may change sign. However, when the equilibrium path
approaches the investment point, supplies must increase, so that our main conclusion
holds irrespective of the utility functional form.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium supply path t0
w is
1. constant at level x¡1(¹ x) when vw A ntp;
2. varying over time in x¡1(¹ x)· t0
w · t¤ when v¤ ?v w? ntp, but ultimately increas-
ing to t¤ as vw approaches v¤;
3. strictly increasing for all v¤ ?v w? ntp if consumer surplus x(=) is concave
5 Discounting
Discounting is an important element in resource use when the relevant time horizon is
at least decades. In the traditional Hotelling model, discounting is what distinguishes
17markets at di¤erent dates, which, in the presence of market power, leads to intertemporal
price discrimination. Discounting is thus one reason to discriminate buyers at di¤erent
dates. Another reason is the buyer*s changing opportunity cost of continuing the resource
dependence due to stock depletion, which we have identied in the undiscounted analysis.
The purpose of this section is two-fold. First, we show that the discounted equilibrium
convergest to the undiscounted limit we have described. Second, we explain how the above
two distinct reasons for price discrimination evolve as the stock depletion progresses.
We present a situation where supplies initially decline, when the stock is large, as in
a traditional Hotelling exhaustible resource market. However, ultimately supplies must
increase, when stock declines and the buyer*s outside option starts to drive the equilibrium
dynamics as in the undiscounted case.
Let now the continuous-time discount rate be positive, uA0 . Apart from discounting,
the model is the same as before. In the post-investment phase, discounting does not
change much: for the seller, there is a unique prot-maximizing supply path, equalizing
present-value marginal revenues over the remaining sales time interval, and resulting
in an associated value function Y L(vW) at the time of investment when the remaining
resource stock is vW.
In the pre-investment time interval, at each stock level, the seller*s optimal sale t0
w is
a best-response to the buyer*s stopping rule (vw>t0
w)satisfying











L( v w)  ( v w>t
0
w)g> (19)
where, as in the undiscounted equation (12), the strategies are dened over some discrete







The unique seller*s supply path after investment also denes the buyer*s welfare
Z L(vW), where we note that since Z L(vW) measures only value of the excursion above the
long-run situation where  ow payo¤ ¹ x is achieved, the overall welfare at the investment
time is equal to Z L(vW)+¹ x@u ¡L. The buyer*s payo¤ before investment is now given by
Z(vw)+¹ x@u ¡ L = max
gw2f0>1g
f[%x((vw) )+h
¡ uZ(vw ¡ %(vw) )+h




Letting % converge to zero, we nd the positive discounting equivalent of (10):
18x
0




L 0( v w) = (22)
When the buyer is indi¤erent between continuation and stopping, (22) holds as an
equality with obvious interpretation: waiting cost of continuation is now ¹ x ¡ uL and, in
addition to the depletion e¤ect t0
wZ L0(vw), buyers must receive return on the asset they are
holding (investment option), uZL(vw). Assuming that the buyer*s indi¤erence condition is
uniformly continuous in (vw>t 0
w), it is also continuously di¤erentiable in u, and so it is clear
that for u ! 0, the equilibrium uniformly converges to the zero-discounting equilibrium.
Thus, the zero-discounting equilibrium describes well the equilibrium features of a low-
discount rate equilibrium. The investment point vW = v¤ occurs when the seller cannot





L 0 ( v W) =
For zero discounting, we have seen that this condition is equivalent to x0(t¤)=
x 0 ( v ¤ @n), t0
w = t¤, which ensures that supply (immediately) after investment v¤@n, which
we labeled as t1
W, is equal to supply immediately before investment, t0
W = t¤ = t1
W. With
positive discounting, there may be a jump up (or down) in supply at the moment of
investment if x0(t1
W) 6= Z L0(v¤). To ensure continuity, we need restrictions on demand.
We can solve the equilibrium explicitly by assuming constant elasticity of demand
 = ¡
1
1¡, generated by a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility, e x(t)=t  ,
with 0 ??1 =Thus, #(t)=t¡1, (t)=t, and x(t) = (1 ¡ )t. Under
positive discounting, the supply tw after investment satises 0(tw)=h u ( w ¡ W )  , for some





















1¡. Notice that D ! n1¡ for u ! 0 consistent
with the zero discounting results. For the investment to yield a positive return, we assume
h¡un








where, for convenience of notation, we substituted t for t0
w.
19The rst below Lemma shows that supply is continuous at investment point: t1
W =
t¤. This requires x0(t1
W)=Z L 0 ( v ) . The second Lemma uses this nding to prove that
the seller prefers continuation to stopping at the investment point, which ensures that
(23) holds up to the point where investment takes place. The third Lemma then uses
continuity of supply and (23) to establish the values for the resource stock and supply
level at the investment point. It also shows that the slope for (v>t) den e db y( 2 3 )i s
downwards for values of v close to v¤, but upwards for large values of v.
Lemma 3 Under constant elasticity of demand, equilibrium supply is continuous at the
investment point.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 4 Under constant elasticity of demand, the seller prefers continuation to stop-
ping at the investment point.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 5 Given , assume n and u satisfy
(1 ¡ h
¡$n)





h ¡ un¹ x¡uL
(1 ¡ )2D
¡








For v ¸ v¤ but su¢ciently close to v¤, seller*s supply t0
w = (vw) is dened by (23) and
declining in vw. For v su¢ciently large, t0
w = (vw) is increasing in vw.
Proof. See Appendix.
These Lemmas lead to the following:
Proposition 5 For constant elasticity of demand and (24) satised, pre-investment equi-
librium supplies rst decline and then increase over time when v0 is su¢ciently large.
We depict the equilibrium time path for supply in Fig. 4, as well as the buyer*s
optimal path. The latter involves choosing the highest supply path such that (i) prices
are equal in present value, and (ii) the stock remaining at the investment time, W ¤> is
20consumed during the technology transition time interval. The equilibrium v¤ is, like in
the undiscounted case, exactly equal to the buyer*s optimal v¤ because, due to constant
elasticity of demand, in the post-investment phase, the seller supplies a competitive
path in both cases as constant demand elasticity eliminates the seller*s benet of price
discrimination at di¤erent dates after the investment. The two paths in Fig. 4 are
therefore identical during the technology transition time interval, starting at W ¤ and W,
respectively. However, before investment, the strategic seller can discriminate buyers at
di¤erent dates according to (22) (the explicit constant elasticity of demand solution is
given in (23)) and delay the arrival of the substitute as in the undiscounted case. When
the stock is still large, supplies decrease over time as in the standard Hotelling model.
When the stock becomes smaller and approaches v¤, supplies increase over time as in the
undiscounted case because the buyer*s indi¤erence becomes binding.
For very large cumulative interest rates over the transition time interval, either in-
vestment takes place immediately, or not at all.
¤¤¤ Insert Fig. 4 here ¤ ¤¤
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we considered strategic interactions between sellers of a depletable resource
and consumers who have interests in ending their dependence on the resource. We
modeled the situation using a framework that departs from explicit bargaining but allows
o¤ers and responses such that neither party is in explicit leadership. The approach seems
relevant since there is signicant coordination of actions on both sides of the market, but
at the same time explicit cooperation of the two sides is not feasible by the di¢culty of
enforcing international agreements. The key question in the relationship is when to start
the process ending the resource dependence, that is, when to change the demand. The
process changing the demand takes time and therefore a potentially signicant fraction of
the resource has to be saved for the transition time interval. Our insights to the problem
follow from this simple allocation problem.
The main insight from our analysis is that producers* market power is reduced over
time as continuing the relationship becomes more costly to consumers when the stock
available for the demand transition is depleted. This means that changing the demand
infrastructure becomes more relevant as a choice, leading to the conclusion that producers
must increase supplies over time.
21What are the main lessons from these results for understanding the oil market? We
believe it is the insight that energy technology policies in oil-importing countries can act
as an increasingly e¤ective strategic instrument, in part destroying producers scarcity
rents. While in general this insight is not new, our approach is new as it accounts for the
fact that the transition is not an immediate event, and this insight results in explicitly
increasing supplies in a stationary market environment.
On a theoretical level, there are some obvious extensions. As we have seen, the size
of the remaining stock is what determines the seller*s ability to entice the buyer side to
postpone actions ending the resource dependence: it is critical for the buyer to observe
how much resource is left for the transition, otherwise the seller can take advantage of
the buyer*s imperfect information for the right timing of the demand change. See Fig. 3
again, and note that the larger is the stock, the lower is the equilibrium supply (at earlier
points on the sales path stocks are larger). In this precise sense, a large stock implies
more power to reduce supplies than a small stock. If the stock is not observed by the
buyer side, a small seller can potentially mimic large seller*s policy of reducing supplies
and, thereby, extend the investment date from what would otherwise hold for the small
seller.
The above observation suggests an extension to situations where there is asymmet-
ric information about the size of the seller*s resource stock. The study of asymmetric
information in resource extraction can also be motivated by the developments in the oil
market. The core reserves of cheap oil are not managed like most productive assets in
market economies; management of cheap oil is characterized by secrecy. The dynasties of
Middle East do not disclose technical production information and make e¤orts to prevent
auditing of the reserves. The future availability of conventional oil is a major public
concern in oil importing countries; industry experts* opinions on the size of economically
viable stocks diverge widely.29
Other extensions are the following. Adding a fringe of competitive producers would
reduce the seller*s market power in a rather straightforward way; the fringe would free-ride
on the seller*s market power by selling rst when the prices are high. Uncertainty about
the technology transition time interval would a¤ect the precise timing of investment
29These concerns are reviewed in the Hirsch report. A book by Matthew R. Simmons (2005) explicates
carefully the industry experts concerns regarding the Saudi stocks. While it is hard to judge the validity
of the arguments in general, one cannot escape the fact that the market cannot evaluate the maturity
of the main Saudi oil elds; Saudi Aramco has not disclosed technical production information since the
early 1980 (Simmons).
22and the level of the supply path, but not the basic insights. A less straightforward
extension is a reversed asymmetric information situation where the buyer side privately
knows whether the adoption decision has been made but the resource stock size is public
information. Alternatively, under the R&D interpretation, the buyer privately knows the
state of the technology. We leave these interesting topics open for future research.
7 Appendix: Proofs
7.1 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Let t1
W refer to optimal monopoly supply immediately after investment. With
zero discounting, we had x0(t1
W)=Z L 0 ( v ¤ )as t1
W equals the consumption level throughout
the post-investment phase until the substitute arrives. With positive discounting, this
equation does not always hold. Let t1
W be supply immediately after investment, so that
 = 0(tL). Thus, when the resource stock increases by small amount ¢v, then supply
changes ¢tw satisfy 00(tw)¢tw = hu(w¡W)¢, for some ¢ such that
R W+n
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The di¤erence between Z L0(v¤) and x0(t1
W) is caused by the di¤erence between the
average value of w over the post-investment time interval [W>W +n], and its value at
time W. It is clear that, for utility with constant relative risk aversion, Z L0(v¤)=x 0 ( t 1
W) .
If utility has decreasing relative risk aversion, relative risk aversion will increase with
decreasing tw, and w will increase, so that Z L0(v¤) > x0(t1
W). Similarly, if utility has
increasing relative risk aversion, Z L0(v¤) 6 x0(t1
W).
7.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. We will show that the seller*s value function has a kink at the time of investment,
Y 0(v¤) AYL 0 ( v ¤ )when Z L0(v¤)=x 0 ( t 1
W) , so the sellers would always prefer continuation
23rather than stopping in such a situation. Changes in n play a role in the argument, and
so we write the seller*s payo¤ as a function of both the stock level and the transition
time length n. We write Y L(vw>n) and Y L(vw) interchangeably, and similarly Y L
v (vw>n)
and Y L0(vw). Flow prots are concave by assumption, and supplies strictly positive at the
end of the overall sales time interval, tW+n A 0, so it is clear that the seller*s value of the
resource increases with the transition time length n, Y L
n (vw>n)A0. After investment, the
























W) A uY L(v¤)+t LYL 0 ( v ¤ ) . This together with continuous supply implied by
Lemma 3 and value matching, Y (v¤)=YL( v ¤ ) , implies Y 0(v¤) AYL 0 ( v ¤ ) .
7 . 3 P r o o fo f5
Proof. We nd the equilibrium v¤ in the lemma by using Z L0(v¤)=x 0 ( t ) >which denes
t¤, in (23) and noting that the buyer*s indi¤erence can hold only if (24) holds; we can
focus on buyer*s indi¤erence based on Lemma 4.
Given (24), we verify that t0
w = (vw) dened by (23) is decreasing in v for vAv ¤ .
Condition (23) implicitly den e st w ov a l u e so ftgiven vAv ¤ . The equilibrium strategy
must satisfy gY 0(v)@ g t?0where Y 0(v) is given by (20) and evaluated at (v>t)=( v ¤ >t¤).
Condition (24) ensures that this holds and implies that the lower trajectory ending at
(v¤>t ¤)is the equilibrium strategy. Thus, equilibrium supply t0
w = (vw) dened by the
buyer*s indi¤erence (23) is decreasing for levels of vw close to v¤. The downward slope
of t0
w = (vw) continues until a point is reached where t0
w = $vw. After this point, t0
w
dened by (23) becomes increasing in vw. Since, at the investment point, (24) ensures
that t¤ A $v¤, we must have that the point with t0
w = $vw is reached for vw Av ¤ . At
the same time, the seller*s prot maximization also denes a supply level that increases
with the stock level for reasons similar to the Hotelling rule. Thus, for large stock levels,
whether the sellers prefer to sell more than needed to prevent the buyer from investing, or
whether the buyer*s indi¤erence condition determines supplies, for large stocks, supplies
will initially fall when the stock is depleted.
Condition (24) can be seen as a restriction on un, the cumulative discount rate over the
entire transition time. For un =0 , LHS=RHS=0 in (24). For un # 0, the LHS derivative
24w.r.t. un becomes innite (the LHS is proportional to ( un
1¡)) ,w h i l et h eR H Sb e c o m e s
proportional to
un
1¡, thus the inequality holds. For un large, the LHS converges to ,
while the RHS converges to 1, thus the inequality fails. If either the discount rate u
or transition time n is su¢ciently large, investment will take place immediately without
any time interval of strategic interaction. In terms of the equations, this can be seen as
follows. When (24) comes close to an equality, the denominator of v¤ in (25) goes to zero,
and so v¤ goes to innity.
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